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We shall land at Inchon, and I shall crush them. -General of the Army Douglas A. MacArthur A military genius takes a situation which is not working, envisions a unique plan everyone else believes is impossible, and makes it a successful operation. A review of the Inchon Landing operation will show that General Douglas A. MacArthur had the qualities of military genius and brilliant generalship which resulted in the operation's success. "From start to finish it [the Inchon Landing operation] was his idea; he made it work, and probably only he could have done so." Godfrey ranked, "… the decision to land at Inchon as one of unparalleled audacity and which puts it in a category of its own even when compared with [previous World War II] amphibious landings…" 3 Godfrey also wrote that MacArthur, "… demonstrated an extraordinary courage and an even greater strategic insight in initiating the planning of such an operation at a time when his troops already committed to the battle in Korea appeared to be having difficulty in arresting the continuing progress of the enemy."
4
The amazing speed at which the forces were built up, the timely and accurate intelligence information gathered, and the brave and valiant execution of the plan by the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines who successfully fought not just the enemy forces but also the natural miles from Vladivostok. The east coast borders the Sea of Japan, and the west coast borders the Yellow Sea. This proximity to the three great Asian powers makes Korea an extremely valuable piece of real estate, despite its unappealing climate.
6
HISTORY OF KOREA -1905 KOREA - -1950 Korea was occupied by the Japanese after the Russo-Japanese Americans fully understand the requirements of the football field or the baseball diamond. They discipline themselves and suffer by the thousands to prepare for these rigors. A coach or manager who is too permissive soon seeks a new job; his teams fail against those who are tougher and harder. Yet undoubtedly any American officer, in peacetime, who worked his men as hard, or ruled them as severely as a college football coach does, would be removed.
18
In addition to the lack of trained infantry on active duty, General MacArthur was also He was a great thundering paradox of a man…Flamboyant, imperious, and apocalyptic, he carried the plumage of a flamingo, could not acknowledge errors, and tried to cover up his mistakes with sly, childish tricks. Yet he was also endowed with great personal charm, a will of iron, and a soaring intellect. Unquestionably he was the most gifted man-at-arms this nation has produced. He was also extraordinarily brave. In this case we can give one man credit for the fact that the action took place at all. It is probably safe to say that, although envelopment is a standard tactic in any general's arsenal, only MacArthur had the imagination to conceive this one in the face of such adverse conditions. More important is the fact that, having hit upon the plan, only a man of MacArthur's overwhelming self-confidence and high-handedness could have stuck to his guns so stubbornly and -in effectforced the entire US military establishment to undertake it against their will. Korean Army, Seoul." 40 Reynolds further specified, By careful selection of the amphibious landing site and astute understanding of the hydrographic processes, MacArthur achieved one of the most decisive maneuvers in military history. …MacArthur's audacity and expert execution in 1950 epitomizes the proper use of the amphibious assault. …Inchon was bold and audacious. …MacArthur had a sufficiently strong two-division force to achieve his objectives.… [On a geographic scale, the Inchon envelopment was] too deep to allow the enemy the option of rapid response and counterattack. attained unless the approach has had such indirectness as to ensure the opponent's unreadiness to meet it. The indirectness has usually been physical, and always psychological.
In strategy, the longest way round is often the shortest way home." 60 Centuries earlier, the warrior-philosopher Sun Tzu stated,
Military formation is like water -the form of water is to avoid the high and go to the low, the form of a military force is to avoid the full and attack the empty; the flow of water is determined by the earth, the victory of a military force is determined by the opponent. So a military force has no constant formation, water has no constant shape; the ability to gain victory by changing and adapting according to the opponent is called genius. Obviously, the plans needed for an amphibious flanking movement, deep into the North Korean's rear areas, required much more analysis and detail than could be provided from a theory. However, the concept of an indirect approach by way of an amphibious flanking movement, around to the enemy's rear, was sound. Aside from its military achievement, MacArthur's Inchon scheme might be judged by the quality of the opposition it aroused, for almost everyone was opposed to it. General Omar Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was rather inclined to think that the day of the big amphibious operation was past. General J. Lawton Collins, "Lightning Joe" of World War II fame, now Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, thought the proposed operation was too deep in the North Korean rear and might well leave the invaders stranded and contained. The Navy's objections were largely couched in terms of the technical difficulties; the same was true of the Marines, who were the amphibious assault forces, but who were not keen to land over a seawall and charge directly into a city. That was not quite in keeping with their experience. Most of these other commanders [Navy and Marine] agreed with the idea of a landing, but wanted it in some other, less difficult place, such as perhaps Kunsan.
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INCHON ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES
Disadvantages
Landing at Inchon had numerous disadvantages. The Salee River, the approach route to Inchon, culminated in a dead end with no room for maneuver. There is a deep enough tidal range of 32 feet but only 3-4 days per month. Therefore, the only day, when the tides would be acceptable and before winter weather set in would be 15 September, giving only 23 days of preparation and build-up time. If the landings were impossible on the 15 th of September, then
MacArthur would have to wait for an entire month for the right conditions to recur. The approaches were also difficult due to channel currents of at least 3 knots and up to 8 knots caused by the extreme tides. Wolmi Do and So Wolmi Do Islands stuck out into the approach channel, and Wolmi Do Island was garrisoned. The tides are high enough for landing craft only twice a day: morning high tide 45 minutes after sunrise and evening high tide 37 minutes after sunset. Also, the landing craft would have to maneuver in the daylight, so the landing would have to be made in two stages, on the morning and evening tides, with the first landing party exposed all day. There were no beaches due to a high sea wall of 14 feet and mud flats 18,000 feet from shore. ) As a matter of fact, there were relatively no troops available at the time since all reinforcements were being sent to the Pusan Perimeter.
There was also the issue of the distance between Inchon and Pusan, which precluded mutual support between the two separated U.N. forces. It was theoretically possible that due to the distances involved, one or both of the two forces could be defeated in detail, before the other could respond.
The disadvantages and risks seemed to everyone except General MacArthur to outweigh the advantages. 81 "He was convinced that as long as he was willing to risk his life for something he believed in, everyone else should be willing to do the same." 82 MacArthur himself stated, "I was now finally ready for the last great stroke to bring my plan into fruition… a turning movement deep into the flank and rear of the enemy that would sever his supply lines and encircle all his forces south of Seoul. I had made similar decisions in past campaigns, but none more fraught with danger, none that promised to be more vitally conclusive if successful."
83
Advantages
Despite the disadvantages, a landing at Inchon also offered several significant advantages. First, Inchon was the nearest landing site to the largest airfield in Korea, Kimpo, which would be essential for aerial resupply missions and strategic and tactical air operations.
Second, Inchon was the chief port for the Korean capital -Seoul, which was only 18 miles away. It is plainly apparent that here in Asia is where the Communist conspirators have elected to make their play for global conquest…It is here and it is now -it is along the Naktong River in South Korea…Actually, we here fight Europe's war with arms, while there it is still confined to words…If we lost the war to Communism in Asia, the fate of Europe will probably be saved from war and stay free. Make the wrong decision here -the fatal decision of inertia -and we will be done…We must act now or we will die. , and the remaining 9,000 shortfall was made up of hastily drafted, non-Englishspeaking Korean civilians, trained on the buddy system. It is interesting that an Army which had not even integrated blacks would consider such a system; however, desperate times call for desperate measures. 99 On 14 September, the X Corps comprised 70,000 marines and GIs (Army troops).
100
According to Manchester, the only unit that could have made the impossible a success was the 1 st Marine Division. They were the cutting edge of the military with extensive amphibious experience during World War II at Guadalcanal, New Guinea and Okinawa. They were also in peak condition. The Navy was the best equipped and prepared of all the forces involved in the Landing.
Joint Task Force 7, commanded by Admiral Struble, "…provided air cover, shore bombardment, blockade, minesweeping, and logistics support for Admiral Doyle's attack force." 104 Altogether 261 vessels from seven nations were involved in one stage or another of the Inchon Landing.
105
Doyle had assembled 17 U.S. Navy tank landing ships (LSTs) and 30 Japanese-manned LSTs (from the civilian Shipping Control Administration of Japan). LSTs which were designed to operate in shallow water and unload directly onto the beach were vital to success at Inchon.
106
Despite Struble's support of the Landing, his reservations about leaving his vehicles "high and dry" overnight were evident in the fact that he used "…eight old LSTs that had previously been decommissioned, and had been kicking around Japanese waters slowly rusting for the last five years. One of them actually had to be towed to Inchon." interpreters, Kim, saying, "It will be part of our job to build up our capability [to obtain the required information]. It's not so much a question of can we do it at this late stage. We are the only ones here, the job has been given to us, and we must do it."
113
Clark reported that the Japanese tide tables were accurate, the sea walls were higher than estimated, and that Wolmi Do was heavily fortified and armed with Soviet artillery pieces. 114 Referring to Wolmi Do, Clark recalled, "It was reiterated that they considered this island the whole key to success or failure of the Inchon invasion. The task force commander, Admiral Doyle, wanted it knocked out at any cost." 115 Clark was discovered by the North Koreans on 7 September, engaged the enemy, and had the destroyer Although Kimpo [airfield] provided X Corps with an important airdrome, the seaport of Inchon was the logistical key to Operation CHROMITE and the liberation of Seoul. Over three thousand Army engineers and support troops, Navy beachmasters, and Marine shore party controllers working with hundreds of Japanese stevedores, hatch-gang laborers, and dragooned Korean workers, repaired port damage, cleared the docks, and pressed the harbor into functional service.
129
On 16 September, the U.S. Marine ground troops moved toward Kimpo Airfield and Seoul. September] an air-observer report reaching General Almond indicated that enemy columns were streaming to the north out of Seoul. Although the air report had some factual foundation, the Marines, hit with counterattacks before they got their own attacks under way, made little or no advance before dawn.
Nonetheless, just before midnight on September 25 General Almond, apparently basing his press release on the air-observer report and the capture of South Mountain, announced the liberation of Seoul. The next day the Marines continued to encounter the same deadly street fighting…and by nightfall of September 26 the Americans held only half the city. MacArthur followed Almond's declaration by issuing on September 26 an official United Nations communiqué announcing, 'Seoul, the capital of the Republic of Korea, is again in friendly hands. The United Nations forces … have completed the envelopment and seizure of the city. ' Actually, fighting in Seoul continued throughout September 27 and 28 before the last groups of the North Korean invaders were ferreted out.
137
On the morning of 27 September, elements of Walker's EUSA met elements of Almond's X Corps at Osan; "the campaign for South Korea was almost over." 138 There was a great deal of mustard colored haze and black smoke, rain, and gathering darkness and unanticipated crosscurrents during the landing on the Inchon beaches. As a result, some landing craft drifted to the wrong beaches. Some Marines had to go overland to link up with the rest of the landing party, while other groups were backed up on the same beaches, creating a great clog of Marines. Also, there were some friendly fire casualties.
Despite the confusion, the landings were quite successful and with only 21 killed and 174 wounded in action.
142
The weather and smoke problems were unavoidable; however, some confusion could have been alleviated had the landing craft drivers been more experienced and trained. The author Edwin H. Simmons, a company commander in the Inchon Landing, knew he was approaching the wrong landing site and asked his driver if he had a compass. "He looked at his instrument panel and said, 'Search me. Six weeks ago I was driving a truck in San
Francisco.'"
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General Walker had great difficulty breaking out of the Pusan Perimeter. The troops were exhausted from months of sustained combat. "There had been heavy losses in equipment as well as men." 144 The Naktong River was extremely difficult to cross with their inadequate equipment. Even more difficult was the fact that the North Koreans maintained their offensive against the Pusan Perimeter for an additional seven days, following the Inchon Landings.
The North Koreans did not respond to the leaflets and broadcasts of the Inchon Landing success. Perhaps they could not read the leaflets and did not believe the broadcasts.
Commenting on the interrogation of North Korean police and soldiers, Lieutenant Clark stated, "Their indoctrination had included lectures on the long arm of the Reds… They were more afraid of their own people than they were of us and would take their chances accordingly." 145 The front did not begin opening up until 22 September.
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According to General J. Lawton Collins, Chief of Staff of the Army, General Almond was not the right man to command the attack on Seoul. "General Collins surmised that MacArthur placed Major General Almond in command of X Corps simply to enable him to be promoted to lieutenant general. This was in spite of the fact that he had no combat amphibious experience and a more senior and experienced Marine General with an existing staff was available."
147
Those directly involved with the Landing also felt General Almond was not the best choice.
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(See also THE COMMANDERS, OTHER COMMANDERS section beginning on page 8.)
WHAT WENT RIGHT All branches of the armed forces gave their best efforts. They coordinated and cooperated with each other regardless of personal feelings and personality clashes. "The Navy and Marine Corps had never fully accepted the plan; yet they carried it out to perfection."
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Despite the infighting between the Services during this period, MacArthur had accentuated each Service's strengths.
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The intelligence gathered in advance was comprehensive and accurate. Navy Lieutenant 
